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Abstract
Physical layer security which safeguards data confidentiality based on the information-theoretic approaches has
received significant research interest recently. The key idea behind physical layer security is to utilize the intrinsic
randomness of the transmission channel to guarantee the security in physical layer. The evolution towards 5G wireless
communications poses new challenges for physical layer security research. This paper provides a latest survey of
the physical layer security research on various promising 5G technologies, including physical layer security coding,
massive multiple-input multiple-output, millimeter wave communications, heterogeneous networks, non-orthogonal
multiple access, full duplex technology, etc. Technical challenges which remain unresolved at the time of writing
are summarized and the future trends of physical layer security in 5G and beyond are discussed.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, wireless networks have been widely used in civilian and military applications and become an
indispensable part of our daily life. People rely heavily on wireless networks for transmission of important/private
information, such as credit card information, energy pricing, e-health data, command, and control messages.
Therefore, security is a critical issue for future 5G wireless networks [1]. Basically, the security today relies
on bit-level cryptographic techniques and associated protocols at various levels of the data processing stack. These
solutions have drawbacks: standardized protections within public wireless networks are not secure enough, and
many of their weaknesses are well known; even if enhanced ciphering and authentication protocols exist, they
occur strong constraints and high additional costs for the users of public networks, etc. Therefore, new security
approaches are issued from information theory fundamentals and focus on the secrecy capacity of the propagation
channel, which is referred as physical layer security [2]–[10].
The advantages of employing physical layer security techniques for 5G networks compared to that of cryptography
techniques are on two folds. First, physical layer security techniques do not rely on computational complexity. As
a result, even if the eavesdroppers (unauthorized smart devices) in the 5G networks are equipped with power
computational devices, the secure and reliable communications can still be achieved. In contrast, the security of
computation-based cryptography techniques will be compromised if the eavesdroppers’ devices have sufficient
computational capacities for hard mathematical problem. The 5G networks must simultaneously meet various
different service requirements with hierarchical architectures [1], which implies that devices are always connected to
the nodes with different powers and different computational capacity levels. Second, the structures of 5G networks
are usually decentralized, which implies devices may randomly connect in or leave the network at any time instants.
For this case, cryptographic key distribution and management become very challenging. As a result, physical layer
security techniques can be used to either perform secure data transmission directly or generate the distribution of
cryptography keys in the 5G networks. With careful management and implementation, physical layer security can
be used as an additional level of protection on top of the existing security schemes. As such, they will formulate
a well-integrated security solution together that efficiently safeguards the confidential and privacy communication
data in 5G wireless networks.
Considering the potential of physical layer security for 5G wireless communications, the opportunities and
challenges on how the innovative 5G technologies achieve a high security level at the physical layer deserves
to receive more attention from the research community. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive
2summarization of the latest physical layer security research results on the key technologies of 5G wireless networks.
In particular, we focus on the following typical technologies:
1) Physical layer security coding: Although the first physical layer security code appears around 1970s, to design
explicit security codes which can be used in practical communication systems is still challenging. We review
the state of art of three important physical layer security codes, including low-density parity-check (LDPC)
codes, polar codes, and lattice codes.
2) Massive MIMO: Deploying large antenna arrays significantly increases the spatial dimension of wireless
channels. We discuss how to exploit the extra spatial resources to effectively combat the eavesdropper and
guarantee the secure communication at physical layer. Both the passive and the active eavesdropper scenarios
are described.
3) Millimeter wave (mmWave) communications: Abundant spectra within the high frequency band may result
in significant different propagation environments for physical layer secure communication. To understand
mmWave secure transmission more clearly, research works for both point-to-point and network mmWave
communication systems are introduced.
4) Heterogeneous networks: In general, a heterogeneous network is consisted of various tiers of networks which
operates in the same system bandwidth. We describe in details on how to design transmission schemes to
secure multi-tier communications simultaneously.
5) Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA): As a multiple access technology, the security of NOMA communi-
cations is an important concern which should be paid more attention. The physical layer security technology
can be combined with NOMA to tackle this issue. The physical layer security of NOMA is a new and
promising research frontier, where a few relevant research results so far will be summarized.
6) Full duplex technology: The full duplex technology brings both the opportunity and the challenge for the
physical layer security communication. On one hand, the full duplex technology enables the receiver to
generate additional AN to interferer the eavesdropper. On the other hand, the eavesdropper with full duplex
technology can actively attack the communication process while eavesdropping. In general, we discuss four
categorizations of full-duplex physical layer security communications, including the full duplex receiver, the
full duplex transmitter and receiver, the full duplex base station, and the full duplex eavesdropper.
Moreover, we also introduce other important results for physical layer security for future wireless networks, such
as the joint physical-application layer secure transmission design, the practical test bed design for physical layer
3security, etc. The future research challenges of physical layer security in 5G and beyond are also discussed.
It should be noted that there are already many survey and tutorial papers for physical layer security research
[11]–[14]. However, a comprehensive study of physical layer security techniques for 5G wireless networks is
still missing, which is the main contribution of this paper. The most relevant work is [12], where physical layer
security for only three 5G techniques are briefly discussed in a big picture without introducing the research results
in details. In contrast, our paper provides a comprehensive detailed summarization of latest research results on
physical layer security for 5G wireless networks. Moreover, the corresponding research challenges at current stage
are also discussed.
II. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY CODING
Most works on physical layer security are based on non-constructive random-coding arguments to establish the
theoretic results. Such results demonstrate the existence of codes that achieve the secrecy capacity, but are of little
practical usefulness. The construction of practical codes for physical layer security has received more attentions
recently. In this section, we review recent works on the construction of three practical codes for physical layer
security, which might be used in 5G communications.
A. LDPC Codes
In [15], A. Thangaraj et al. establish a connection between capacity-achieving codes and secrecy based on the
metric of weak secrecy. It is proved in [15] that for an arbitrary wiretap channel, the perfect secrecy can be achieved
by using codes that achieve the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. This conclusion provides an conceptual
construction for designing the secrecy transmission coding schemes over the general wiretap channel. Moreover,
the authors in [15] use this idea to design LDPC codes based on nested sparse graph codes and a coset coding
scheme over a wiretap channel for a noiseless channel of the desire user and a binary erasure channel (BEC) of
the eavesdropper. The constructed codes are the first secrecy-capacity-achieving LDPC codes in terms of weak
secrecy. Later, V. Rathi et al. generalizes this coding scheme to BEC of both the desire user and the eavesdropper
by designing the two-edge type LDPC codes [16]. However, the proposed construction results in some degree one
variable nodes in the ensemble for the desire user’s channel. To circumvent this problem, numerical methods are
used to optimize the degree distribution of the two edge-type LDPC ensembles. Some relatively simple ensembles
are found, which achieve good secrecy performance and are close to the secrecy capacity. A. Subbramanian et al.
4TABLE I: LDPC Codes for Physical Layer Security
Paper Main Channel Eve Channel Criterion Constituent Codes
A. Thangaraj et al. [15] Noiseless BEC Weak secrecy Duals of LDPC
V. Rathi et al. [16] BEC BEC Weak secrecy Two-edge LDPC
A. Subramanian et al. [17] Noiseless BEC Strong secrecy Duals of LDPC
D. Klinc et al. [18] Gaussian Gaussian BER Punctured LDPC
M. Baldi et al. [19] Gaussian Gaussian BER Non-punctured LDPC
M. Baldi et al. [20] Parallel Rayleigh Parallel Rayleigh BER Non-punctured LDPC
M. Baldi et al. [21] Gaussian Gaussian Equivocation rate of Eve Irregular LDPC
construct LDPC codes with large girth block length based on Ramauja graph for a noiseless channel of the desire
user and BEC of the eavesdropper [17], which achieve strong secrecy with lower rates.
LDPC codes have been designed for the Gaussian wiretap channel. The physical-layer security communication is
realized in [18] by punctured LDPC codes under the criterion of bit-error rate (BER), where the secrecy information
bits are hidden in the punctured bits. Therefore, these information bits are not transmitted through the channel
but can be decoded at the receiver side based on the non-punctured part of the codeword. This coding scheme
can yield a BER close to 0.5 at the eavesdropper’s side while significantly reduces the security gap defined in
[18] comparing to the non-punctured LDPC codes. However, the punctured LDPC codes result in higher power
transmission comparing to the non-punctured LDPC codes. To solve this problem, M. Baldi et al. propose a
nonsystematic coded transmission design by scrambling the information bits [19]. It is shown in [19] that this
scrambling technique achieves security gap comparable to that design based on puncturing but without increasing
the transmit power. This scrambling design has been extended to parallel Rayleigh distributed channels [20]. By
exploiting the equivocation rate of eavesdropper’s channel as an optimization criterion, M. Baldi et al. propose a
code design algorithm in the finite codeword length regime [21]. Based on this algorithm, irregular LDPC codes
which approach the ultimate performance limits with small codeword lengths are constructed. A brief summary of
above work is given in Table I.
B. Polar Codes
For the weak secrecy criterion, H. Mahdavifar et al. construct a polar coding scheme to achieve the secrecy
capacity for the symmetric binary-input memoryless wiretap channel under the condition that the main channel
of the eavesdropper is degraded to the main channel of the desired user [22]. The main idea in [22] is to select
only those bit channels which are good for both the desired user and the eavesdropper to transmit random bits.
5Moreover, those bit channels which are good for desired user but bad for the eavesdropper are used to transmit
information bits. It is proved in [22] that this coding scheme can achieve the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, E. Hof
et al. and M. Andersson et al. independently prove that this coding scheme achieves the entire rate-equivocation
region (Defined in [23]) in [24] and [25], respectively. O. O. Koyluoglu et al. apply this coding scheme into a
key agreement problem over the block fading wiretap channel [26]. The secure polar code is used for each fading
block, from which the secrecy keys are generated based on standard privacy amplification techniques. Y.-P. Wei
et al. develop polar codes for the general wiretap channel by relaxing the degraded and the symmetric constraints
[27]. In addition, this coding scheme is extended to the multiple access wiretap channel (MA-WC), the broadcast
channel with confidential message (BC-CM), and the interference channel with confidential message (IC-CM).
On the other hand, S. A. A. Fakoorian et al. design polar codes to achieve the secrecy capacity for the arbitrary
deterministic wiretap channel [28]. A polar coding scheme for bidirectional relay networks with common and
confidential messages and the decode-and-forward protocol is proposed in [29].
For the strong security criterion, E. Sasogˇlu et al. design a multi-block polar coding scheme [30] which achieves
both security and reliability for the same wiretap channel model as in [22]. T. C. Gulcu et al. provide a simple
coding scheme based on polar codes to achieve the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel (not necessarily
degraded or symmetric) [31]. This coding scheme is also extended to achieve the capacity region of discrete
memoryless BC-CM. Independently, R. A. Chou et al. design a more general (holds for more general conditions
as given in [32, Fig. 1]) polar coding scheme for discrete memoryless BC-CM [32]. A brief summary of above
work is given in Table II.
Other polar coding schemes for wiretap channels include the concatenation of two polar codes for the general
wiretap channel [33], the concatenation of polar and LDPC codes to minimize the security gap [34], etc.
C. Lattice Codes
For wiretap lattice codes, J.-C. Belfiore et al. define a notation of secrecy gain, which reflects the eavesdropper’s
correct decoding probability [35], [36]. Asymptotic analysis of the secrecy gain shows that it scales exponentially
with the dimension of the lattice. Also, examples of wiretap lattice codes designed based on this secrecy gain
criterion for the Gaussian wiretap channel are given in [36]. A.-M. E.-Hyto¨nen proves that the symmetry points
in the secrecy function of the even extremal unimodular lattices achieve the secrecy gains [37]. In addition, a
method to examine the secrecy gains for arbitrary unimodular lattices is proposed in [37]. F. Lin et al. calculate the
6TABLE II: Polar Codes for Physical Layer Security
Paper Channel Criterion Main contribution
H. Mahdavifar et al. [22] Symmetric binary-input memoryless degraded wiretap channel Weak secrecy Achieve secrecy capacity
[24], [25] Symmetric binary-input memoryless degraded wiretap channel Weak secrecy Achieve rate-equivocation region
O. O. Koyluoglu et al. [26] Symmetric binary-input memoryless degraded wiretap channel Weak secrecy Generate a key agreement
Y.-P. Wei et al. [27]
General wiretap channel
Weak secrecy
Achieve secrecy capacity
MA-WC, BC-CM, IC-CM Achieve secrecy rate regions
S. A. A. Fakoorian et al. [28] Deterministic wiretap channel Weak secrecy Achieve secrecy capacity
M. Andersson et al. [29] Bidirectional relay networks with confidential messages Weak secrecy Achieve capacity-equivocation region
E. Sasogˇlu et al. [30] Symmetric binary-input memoryless degraded wiretap channel Strong secrecy Achieves both security and reliability
T. C. Gulcu et al. [31] General wiretap channel Strong secrecy Achieve secrecy capacity
R. A. Chou et al. [32] Discrete memoryless BC-CM Strong secrecy Achieve secrecy capacity
TABLE III: Lattice Codes for Physical Layer Security
Paper Channel Criterion Main contribution
J.-C. Belfiore et al. [35], [36] Gaussian wiretap channel Secrecy gain Define secrecy gain
A.-M. E.-Hyto¨nen et al. [37] Gaussian wiretap channel Secrecy gain Propose a method to examine the secrecy gain
F. Lin et al. [38] Gaussian wiretap channel Secrecy gain Construct best lattice codes for dimensions 8 < n ≤ 23
J.-C. Belfiore et al. [39] Rayleigh wiretap channel Secrecy gain Construct a wiretap lattice code
L.-C. Choo et al. [40] Gaussian wiretap channel Weak secrecy Construct a nested lattice code
C. Ling et al. [41] Gaussian wiretap channel Strong secrecy Design wiretap lattice codes
L.-C. Choo et al. [42] Gaussian BC with confidential message Strong secrecy Propose a superposition lattice code
symmetry points of four extremal odd unimodular lattices and 111 nonextremal unimodular lattices for dimensions
8 < n ≤ 23. It is validated that these symmetry points are actually secrecy gains via the method in [38]. Based on
these secrecy gains, the best wiretap lattice codes are determined. The lattice codes which are optimal based on
the secrecy gain criterion for the Rayleigh fading wiretap channels are designed in [39].
From information theory point of view, L.-C. Choo et al. construct a nested lattice code for the Gaussian wiretap
channel based on the equivocation rate, which can meet both the reliability and the weak secrecy criterions [40]. C.
Ling et al. further design wiretap lattice codes achieving the strong secrecy for the Gaussian wiretap channel [41].
Moreover, L.-C. Choo et al. propose a superposition lattice code for the Gaussian BC with confidential message
with the strong secrecy [42]. A brief summary of above work is given in Table III.
Other lattice code designs for the wiretap channel includes: nested lattices code designs for cooperative jamming,
interference channels, and the relay networks [10], [43], [44], the security of the continuous mod-lattice channel
with feedback [45], etc.
7TABLE IV: Secure Massive MIMO with Passive Eavesdropper
Paper System Model Main Contribution
J. Zhu et al. [47] Multi-cell multi-user, one desired user, one eavesdropper, i.i.d. Rayleigh Matched filtering precoding and AN generation designs
J. Zhu et al. [48] Multi-cell multi-user, one desired user, one eavesdropper, i.i.d. Rayleigh Regularized channel inversion and AN generation designs
J. Wang et al. [49] One desired user, multiple eavesdroppers, i.i.d. Rician AN-aided secure transmission designs
K. Guo et al. [50] Single-cell, multiple desired users, one eavesdropper, correlated Rayleigh Distributed power allocation under security-constraints
Y. Wu et al. [51] One desired user, one eavesdropper, perfect CSI Secure transmission with finite alphabet inputs
X. Chen et al. [52], [53] Relay-aided, one desired user, one eavesdropper, i.i.d. Rayleigh Secrecy performance analysis and power allocation designs
III. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN MASSIVE MIMO SYSTEMS
Massive MIMO is a promising approach for efficient transmission of massive information and is regarded as one
of “big three” 5G technologies [46]. In this section, we review the current security threats and countermeasures of
massive MIMO technology based on passive and active eavesdropper scenarios, respectively.
A. Passive Eavesdropper Scenarios
Physical layer security for massive MIMO systems with passive eavesdroppers has been recently studied. J.
Zhu et al. study secure massive MIMO transmissions for multi-cell multi-user systems over i.i.d. Rayleigh fading
channel [47], where a passive eavesdropper attempts to decode the information sent to one of the users. The impact
of multi-cell interference and pilot contamination on the achievable erogdic secrecy rate are analyzed and several
matched filtering precoding and artificial noise (AN) generation designs are proposed to degrade the eavesdropper’s
channel and protect the desired user’s channel. For the same system model, regularized channel inversion and
AN transmission schemes are designed in [48] to further improve the secrecy rate performance. J. Wang et al.
investigate AN-aided secure massive MIMO transmission over i.i.d. Rician fading channel [49]. For single-cell
multiuser massive MIMO systems with distributed antennas, K. Guo et al. design three secure-constrained power
allocation schemes [50] by maximizing the minimum user’s signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR) subject to
the eavesdropper’s SINR and the sum power constraint and minimizing the sum transmit power subject to SINR
constraints of users and the eavesdropper, respectively. Y. Wu et al. investigate secure transmission designs for
large-scale MIMO systems with finite alphabet inputs [51]. Power allocation schemes for relay-aided large-scale
MIMO systems are proposed in [52], [53]. A brief summary of above work is given in Table IV.
Other secure massive MIMO work with passive eavesdroppers include: secure transmission for massive MIMO
systems with limited radio frequency and hardware impairments [54], [55], secure strategies in presence of a massive
MIMO eavesdropper [56], [57], secrecy outage probability analysis for massive MIMO systems [58], etc.
8B. Active Eavesdropper Scenarios
Most physical layer security research work assume that perfect channel knowledge of the legitimate user is
available at the transmitter and do not consider the procedure required to obtain this channel. In time duplex
division (TDD) communication systems, the users in an uplink training phase will send pilot signals to the base
station (BS) to estimate the channel for the subsequent downlink transmission. From the eavesdropper’s point of
view, it can actively send the same pilot signals as the users to attack this uplink channel training phase and hence
significantly increase its eavesdropping capability [59].
This pilot contamination attack causes a serious secrecy threat to TDD-based massive MIMO systems. On one
hand, large antenna arrays beamforming leads to the hardening of the channel, which prevents the exploitation of
channel fluctuations caused by fading to improve the secrecy performance. On the other hand, as illustrated in Figure
1, the pilot contamination attack enables the transmitter to beamform towards the the eavesdropper instead of the
desired user. If the eavesdropper’s pilot power is sufficiently large, a positive secrecy rate may not be achievable. This
is significantly different from the conventional idea that massive MIMO naturally facilitates secure communication
since the large antenna arrays can generate very narrow beams focusing on the desired users without spilling over
the signal power in other directions. In the first time, Y. Wu et al. systematically analyze the secrecy threat caused
by the pilot contamination attack for multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems over correlated fading channels
[60]. Then, a matched filter precoding and AN generation design and a null space design are provided in [60] to
combat the pilot contamination attack for weakly correlated channels and highly correlated channels, respectively.
A unified design which combines the matched filter precoding and AN generation design and the null space design
is also proposed. Simulations indicate that these designs can guarantee reliable secure communication under the
pilot contamination attack, as shown in Fig. 2. At the same time, Y. O. Basciftci et al. study the pilot contamination
attack problem for single-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems over i.i.d. fading channels [61]. It is proved in
[61] that if the pilot contamination attack does not exist, the maximum secure degree of freedom (DoF) of massive
MIMO systems is the same as the maximum DoF of massive MIMO systems when the eavesdropper does not
exist. However, if the pilot contamination attack exists, the maximum secure DoF of massive MIMO systems could
be zero. To defense the pilot contamination attack, Y. O. Basciftci et al. expand cardinality of the pilot signal set
and hide the pilot signal within the enlarged set. On the other hand, S. Im et al. employ a secret key agreement
protocol for single-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems with the pilot contamination attack [62]. An estimator is
designed at the BS side to evaluate the information leakage. Then, the BS and the desired user perform the reliable
9TABLE V: Secure Massive MIMO with Active Eavesdropper
Paper System Model Main Contribution
Y. Wu et al. [60]
Multi-cell multi-user, one desired user Systematically analyze the secrecy threat caused by the pilot contamination attack
one eavesdropper, correlated Rayleigh Propose efficient schemes to combat the pilot contamination attack
Y. O. Basciftci et al. [61]
Single-cell multi-user, multiple desired users Analyze maximum secure DoF with the pilot contamination attack
one eavesdropper, i.i.d. Rayleigh Propose a scheme to hide the pilot signal under the pilot contamination attack
S. Im et al. [62]
Single-cell multi-user, one desired user Employ secret key agreement protocol with the pilot contamination attack
one eavesdropper, i.i.d. Rayleigh Adjust the lengths of the secrecy key based on the estimated information leakage
secure communication by adjusting the lengths of the secrecy key based on the estimated information leakage. A
brief summary of above work is given in Table V.
Other secure massive transmission against active eavesdropper includes pilot retransmission strategies [63] and
the secure transmission design based on game theory [64], etc.
Base Station User Eve
Without Pilot 
Contamination Attack 
With Pilot 
Contamination Attack 
Fig. 1: Pilot contamination attack on massive MIMO systems
IV. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FOR MMWAVE COMMUNICATIONS
One of the most promising potential 5G technologies under consideration is the use of high-frequency signals in
the millimeter-wave frequency band that could allocate more bandwidth to deliver faster, higher-quality video
and multimedia content [65]. Comparing to micro-Wave networks, the mmWave networks have various new
characteristics such as the large number of antennas, short range and highly directional transmissions, different
propagation laws, and sensitive to blockage effects, etc. Therefore, the secure mmWave communications will be
different from the conventional secure micro-Wave communications.
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Fig. 2: Exact secrecy rate vs. the SNR for 128 antennas massive MIMO systems and different precoding
designs. Experimental results extracted from [60].
L. Wang et al. first show that the high secrecy throughout can be achieved for a point-to-point mmWave com-
munication system with multiple eavesdroppers [66]. Assuming the uniform linear array (ULA) at the transmitter,
an analog beamforming with phase shift is employed based on the perfect CSI of the desired user. The ergodic
secrecy rate expressions are derived for both delay-tolerant and delay-limited transmission modes. In particular,
simulations show that with a large number of transmit antennas, the delay-tolerant transmission mode can achieve
multi-gigabit per second secrecy rate at mmWave frequencies. Motivated by this, Y. Ju et al. further evaluate
the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication over the multiple-input, single-output, single-antenna
eavesdropper (MISOSE) wiretap channel [67]. Based on the perfect CSI of the desired user and the statistical CSI
of the eavesdropper, the secrecy outage probability and secrecy throughout of the matched filter precoding and
AN generation design are analyzed. The obtained results reveal that the overlap between the desired user’s and
the eavesdropper’s spatially resolvable paths has an significantly important impact on the secrecy performance of
the mmWave communication. X. Tian et al. investigate the hybrid precoder design for mmWave multiple-input,
multiple-output, multiple-antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel [68].
Based on the stochastic geometry framework, C. Wang et al. investigate the downlink secure communication
11
for mmWave cellular networks as shown in Fig. 3 [69]. The BSs perform the directional beamforming with the
intended users’ perfect CSI and both the legitimate users and eavesdroppers in the networks are equipped with a
single omnidirectional antenna. As indicated in Fig. 4, it is shown that narrowing the beam width of directional
beamforming antenna with more focused array gain is beneficial for increasing the secrecy performance of mmWave
networks. In addition, the effects of antenna array pattern, base station intensity, and AN generation on secrecy
performance are investigated in [69]. For the same system model, S. Vuppala et al. further analyze the secrecy
performance for the mmWave and the micro-Wave hybrid communication [70]. It is revealed in [70] that the
blockages in mmWave networks can decrease the secrecy outage probability.
LOS Base Station
Typical User 
Eve
Directional Beamforming
NLOS Base Station
Reflections of NLOS Link 
Random Blockage Process
Eve
Fig. 3: Downlink secure communication for the mmWave cellular network
Y. Zhu et al. investigate the physical layer security for large-scale mmWave ad hoc networks, which are modeled
based on stochastic geometry [71]. The directional beamforming is used between the transmitters and the desired
receivers and the corresponding average secrecy rate is derived. For the special case of ULA, an explicit expression
for the average secrecy rate is obtained, which reveals that using more antennas at the transmitters is beneficial
for suppressing the array gains at the eavesdroppers’ side. The proper power allocation between the transmit signal
and AN is also discussed. S. Gong et al. investigate the secure precoding design for mmWave two-way amplify-
and-forward (AF) MIMO relaying networks by exploiting the global perfect CSI [72]. To reduce the hardware cost
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Fig. 4: Secrecy connectivity probability of mmWave cellular networks. Experimental results extracted from [69].
θb, Ms, ms denote the beam width of the main lobe, the array gain of the main lob, and the array gain of the
sidelobe of the directional beamforming, respectively. λE denote the intensity of eavesdroppers.
and power consumption for the mmWave communication, an additional rank constraint is posed on the precoding
matrix at the relay to control the number of analog-to-digital converters in the system.
The mmWave communication system is usually equipped with a large number of antennas at the transmitter with
a limited number of radio frequency (RF) chains. To take advantage of this point, N. Valliappan et al. consider
another approach by using an antenna subset modulation (ASM) technique to reach secure mmWave communication
at physical layer [73]. The proposed approach utilizes a subset of antenna array to formulate a directional modulation
signal intended for the desired user. By randomly choosing the antenna subset for each symbol, the received signal
for the undesired user becomes a randomized noise. Therefore, the secure transmission is achieved. M. E. Eltayeb
et al. further extended this ASM technique to mmWave vehicular communication systems [74]. A brief summary
of above work is given in Table VI.
From the eavesdropper’s point of view, the work in [75] also considers the potential attack in mmWave com-
munication. It is shown in [75] that even by using highly directional mmWaves, the reflection signals caused by
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TABLE VI: Secure mmWave Communications
Paper System Model CSI Objective
L. Wang et al. [66]
Point-to-point MISO Perfect CSI of the desired user
Analyze ergodic secrecy rate
Multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers Statistical CSI of eavesdroppers
Y. Ju et al. [67] MISOSE wiretap channel
Perfect CSI of desired user Analyze secrecy outage probability
Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper Analyze secrecy throughout
X. Tian et al. [68] MIMOME wiretap channel
Perfect CSI of desired user
Hybrid precoders design
Perfect CSI/No CSI of the eavesdropper
C. Wang et al. [69] Stochastic geometry cellular networks
Perfect CSI of desired user Analyze secure connectivity probability
Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper Evaluate the effect of AN
S. Vuppala et al. [70]
Stochastic geometry cellular networks Perfect CSI of the desired user
Analyze the secrecy outage probability
MmWave/micro-Wave hybrid communication Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper
Y. Zhu et al. [71] Stochastic geometry mmWave ad hoc networks
Perfect CSI of desired user
Analyze the average secrecy rate
Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper
S. Gong et al. [72]
AF MIMO relay networks
Global perfect CSI Secrecy precoders design
A multiple-antenna eavesdropper
N. Valliappan et al. [73]
MISO, limited RF chains Perfect CSI of the desired user
Formulate directional modulation
Single-antenna eavesdroppers No CSI of the eavesdropper
M. E. Eltayeb et al. [74]
MISO, a single RF chain (vehicular systems) Perfect CSI of the desired user
Formulate directional modulation
A single-antenna eavesdropper No CSI of the eavesdropper
small-scale physical objects will be beneficial to the eavesdropper. In some cases, the achievable secrecy rate can
be decreased to zero by the attack.
V. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS
The 5G heterogeneous networks should intelligently and seamlessly integrate multiple nodes to form a multi-tier
hierarchical architecture, including the macro cell tiers with high-power nodes for large radio coverage areas, the
small cell tiers with low-power nodes for small radio coverage areas, the device tiers which support device to
device communications, etc. Fig. 5 shows a typical 4-tier macro/pico/femto/D2D heterogeneous network with users
and eavesdroppers. This multi-tier architecture brings new challenges to the investigation of physical layer security
compared to the conventional single-tier topology. For example, the locations of the high/low power nodes will have
a significant impact on the physical layer security design, which need to be modeled and analyzed properly. The
optimal selection policy for each user among high/low power nodes under security constraints becomes difficult. The
protection of confidential and privacy data between connected devices against data leakage requires sophisticated
designs. Moreover, heterogeneous networks may introduce severe cross-tier interference. This should be taken into
consideration when designing the reliable and secure data transmission schemes. In addition, users are accessible
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to an arbitrary tier, e.g., open access. Therefore, specific user association policies that coordinate both quality of
service and secrecy are necessary.
Macro Base Station User EvePico Base Station Fetmo Base Station
Device to Device
Fig. 5: A 4-tier macro/pico/femto/D2D heterogeneous network with users and eavesdroppers.
T. Lv et al. first study the physical layer security in a downlink two-tier heterogeneous network with multiple
single-antenna users and a single-antenna eavesdropper in each cell [76]. Both the orthogonal spectrum allocation
(OSA) scheme and the secrecy-oriented non-orthogonal spectrum allocation (SONOSA) scheme are considered.
For OSA scheme, no interference from other cells exists and a transmit strategy to maximize the secrecy rate of
one desired user under the quality of service (QoS) constraints of other users is proposed. For SONOSA, some
femtocell base stations near the eavesdropper are allocated the same spectrum efficiency as the macrocell base
station. Then, these femtocell base stations cooperate to generate the maximal interference at the eavesdropper side
while guaranteeing the QoS requirements for the femtocell users. H. Wu et al. propose a user association policy
by comparing the average received signal at the desired user with a given threshold [77]. Then, assuming both the
inter-and intra-cell interference do not exist, closed-form expressions of secrecy outage probability are obtained
for a downlink K-tier heterogeneous network with single-antenna nodes by modeling the locations of the nodes
as independent Poisson Point Processes (PPPs). Furthermore, Y. J. Tolossa et al. derive the average secrecy rate
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TABLE VII: Secure transmission in heterogeneous networks
Paper System Model Main Contribution
T. Lv et al. [76] Downlink two-tier heterogeneous network Propose secure transmission schemes in the first time
H. Wu et al. [77] Downlink K-tier heterogeneous network, no interference Analyze secrecy outage probability
Y. J. Tolossa et al. [78] Downlink K-tier heterogeneous network, no interference Analyze average secrecy rate
M. Xu et al. [79] Downlink K-tier heterogeneous network, intra-cell interference Incorporate a dynamic CoMP scheme
H.-M. Wang [80] Downlink K-tier heterogeneous network, inter-and intra-cell interference Analyze secrecy and connection probabilities
W. Wang [81] Downlink small network, inter-and intra-cell interference Analyze secrecy and connection probabilities
H. Wu [82] Uplink two-tier heterogeneous network, inter-and intra-cell interference Analyze secrecy and connection probabilities
Y. Ren [83]
Downlink two-tier heterogeneous network
Secure transmission design
Wireless information and power transfer
expression under the association policy that any potential base station who provides kth largest path gain to the
user can be selected as the association base station [78]. For a downlink K-tier heterogeneous network with only
intra-cell interference, M. Xu et al. propose a dynamic coordinated multipoint transmission (CoMP) scheme to
increase the secure communication coverage [79].
By considering both inter-and intra-cell interference, H.-M. Wang et al. obtain both secrecy and connection
probabilities of a downlink K-tier heterogeneous network based on a truncated average received signal power user
association policy [80]. A trade off between secrecy and connection probabilities in terms of association threshold,
base station density, and power allocation between the useful signal and AN is revealed. The network-wide secrecy
throughout and minimum secrecy throughout per user subject to both secrecy and connection probability constraints
are further analyzed. W. Wang et al. derive closed expressions of secrecy and connection probabilities for a downlink
small cell network [81]. The obtained results indicate that increasing the base station density is beneficial for both
secrecy and connection outage probability performance. The performance of a uplink two-tier heterogeneous network
is investigated in [82]. By using two-dimensional PPPs to approximate the summation of all interference in the
whole space, the authors derive the exact expressions for the successful connection and secrecy outage probabilities.
The secure transmission with wireless information and power transfer in a downlink two-tier heterogeneous network
is studied in [83]. A brief summary of above work is given in Table VII.
VI. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY OF NOMA
Given the scarce bandwidth resource, NOMA plays a crucial role for providing large system throughput, high
reliability, improved coverage, low latency, and massive connectivity in 5G wireless networks [84]. As a result,
NOMA has been recognized as an important enabling technology in 5G wireless communication systems. Because
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of the spectral efficiency benefit, NOMA has been recently included in 3GPP long term evolution advanced (LTE-A),
which further evidences the importance of NOMA in future wireless networks. Thus, providing an unrivalled level
of security for NOMA technology is one of the top priorities in the design and implementation of the 5G wireless
networks. A significant effort is needed to efficiently combine physical layer security with NOMA. However, some
challenges need to be resolved during the design process, such as the dissimilar transmit powers and heterogeneous
security requirements of users. In addition, cooperation among users offers an interesting option to enhance the
secrecy performance.
Y. Zhang et al. first study the secure NOMA transmission for a single-antenna, one transmitter, multiple users,
and one eavesdropper system with perfect CSI of the users and no CSI of the eavesdropper [85]. Perfect successive
interference cancellation (SIC) is performed at each user. The closed-formed expression of the optimal power
allocation policy which maximizes the secrecy sum rate under each user’s QoS constraint is derived. For the same
CSI assumption, Y. Liu et al. further investigate the secure transmission for NOMA networks [86], as shown in
Fig. 6. An eavesdropper-exclusion zone is established. To reduce the SIC complexity at the receiver, a user paring
scheme is employed, where one user in the internal zone and one user in the external zone are allocated the same
resource slot. When the base station only has single antenna, the secrecy outage probability is analyzed. Moreover,
the secrecy diversity order is obtained, which reveals that the user with the weaker channel in the pair determines
the secrecy diversity order. When the base station is equipped with multiple antennas, a matched filter precoding
and AN generation design is employed to further increase the secrecy performance. Based on this design, both
the exact and asymptotic (in large system limit) secrecy outage probability expressions are derived. With perfect
CSI and perfect SIC assumption, Z. Ding et al. consider a NOMA network with both multicasting and unicasting
transmissions [87]. For the unicasting transmission, it it proved that the secrecy rate for NOMA is no less than that
for orthogonal multiple access in the high SNR regime. Also, the secrecy outage probability is studied. A brief
summary of above work is given in Table VIII.
VII. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FOR FULL DUPLEX TECHNOLOGY
Transmitting information by full duplex technology consists in transmitting and receiving simultaneously on the
same frequency band. Theoretically, full duplex communications can double the spectral efficiency compared to the
conventional half duplex communications. These last years, upstream researches have resulted in first demonstrators
showing the feasibility of such systems [88]. Therefore, full duplex technology offers a promising potential for 5G.
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TABLE VIII: Physical Layer Security of NOMA
Paper System Model CSI Objective
Y. Zhang et al. [85]
Single-antenna nodes Perfect CSI of users
Maximize secrecy sum-rate
A transmitter, multiple users, and a eavesdropper No CSI of the eavesdropper
Y. Liu et al. [86]
Downlink single-antenna networks Perfect CSI of users
Analyze secrecy outage probability
Downlink multiple transmit antenna networks No CSI of the eavesdropper
Z. Ding et al. [87]
Downlink MISO networks with
Global perfect CSI
Analyze secrecy outage probability
multicasting and unicasting transmissions for the unicasting transmission
Base Station User Eve
Internal zone
External zone
Eve-exclusion zone 
Infinite two-dimension 
plane for Eve
Fig. 6: Network model for the secure NOMA transmission.
As a result, physical layer security for full duplex systems is a promising research area that has attracted much
attention recently. The research on full-duplex physical layer security transmission can be mainly classified into the
following four categorizations.
A. Full Duplex Receiver
W. Li et al. first study a single-antenna transmitter, a two-antenna full duplex receiver, and a single-antenna
eavesdropper wiretap channel [89], where the full duplex receiver use one antenna to receive the signal and another
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antenna to send AN to the eavesdropper. The perfect self-interference cancellation (SIC) is assumed at the receiver.
The closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability for the proposed transmission scheme is derived. G.
Zheng et al. investigate the joint transmit and receive beamforming design for a single-antenna input, multiple-
antenna output, and multiple-antenna eavesdropper (SIMOME) wiretap channel with imperfect SIC [90]. The full
duplex receiver transmits AN to the eavesdropper while receives data from the transmitter. For the global perfect
CSI assumption, the linear receiver matrix and the AN generation matrix which maximize the achievable secrecy
rate are jointly designed. It is shown that unlike the half duplex case, the secrecy rate no longer saturates at high
SNR for full duplex case. The transmission design for the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper assumption is also
studied in [90]. Moreover, a secure communication scheme for MIMOME wiretap channel with full duplex receiver
and perfect SIC is designed in [91]. L. Li et al. further derive a closed-form expression for the maximal achievable
secure degrees of freedom of the MIMOME wiretap channel with full duplex receiver under the global perfect CSI
and the perfect SIC assumptions [92].
M. Masood et al. study a MIMOME wiretap channel with multiple full duplex receivers and multiple eavesdrop-
pers under the global perfect CSI and the imperfect SIC assumptions [93]. Both the transmitter and the full duplex
receivers will send AN to degrade the channels of the eavesdroppers. In this case, the precoding matrix and the AN
generation matrix are optimized jointly to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. In the mean time, B. Akgun et al.
consider a similar multiple-input single-output multiple-antenna eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel, where
the transmitter employs a zero-forcing beamforming (ZFBF) to eliminate the multiuser interference [94]. Then, the
total transmit power is minimized for both instantaneous and statistical CSI of the eavesdroppers cases subject to
the individual secrecy rate constraint for each user. L. Chen et al. investigate single antenna multi-carrier wiretap
channels with full duplex receivers [95], where the power allocation among the subcarriers is designed to maximize
the secrecy rate under both the total power and the legitimate links sum rate constraints. The secure communication
in a single-input single-output multiple-antenna eavesdropper (SISOME) wireless ad hoc network is analyzed in
[96], where a hybrid full/half duplex receiver deployment strategy is employed. The fractions of full duplex receivers
which optimize the secure link number, the network-wide secrecy throughout, and the network-wide secrecy energy
efficiency are derived.
For a decentralized heterogeneous network which includes a half duplex receiver tier and a full duplex receiver
tier, T.-X. Zheng et al. derive the secrecy outage probability of a typical full duplex receiver based on the stochastic
geometry framework [97]. In addition, the deployment of the full duplex receivers is optimized for the network-
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TABLE IX: Secure Communications with Full Duplex Receivers
Paper System Model CSI Objective
W. Li et al. [89]
A single-antenna transmitter, a two-antenna full duplex receiver Perfect CSI of the desired user Analyze secrecy
A single-antenna eavesdropper, perfect SIC Know the noise of eavesdropper outage probability
G. Zheng et al. [90]
A single-antenna transmitter, a multiple-antenna receiver Global perfect CSI Joint transmit and
A multiple-antenna eavesdropper, imperfect SIC Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper receive beamforming design
Y. Zhou et al. [91] MIMOME wiretap channel, perfect SIC
Perfect CSI of the desired user Design a secure
Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper communication scheme
L. Li et al. [92] MIMOME wiretap channel, perfect SIC Global perfect CSI Derive secure degrees of freedom
M. Masood et al. [93]
MIMOME, multiple receivers
Global perfect CSI Design precoding and AN matrices
Multiple eavesdroppers, imperfect SIC
B. Akgun et al. [94]
MISOME, multiple receivers Global perfect CSI
Minimize total transmit power
Multiple eavesdroppers, imperfect SIC Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper
L. Chen et al. [95]
Single antenna multi-carrier
Global channel amplitudes
Design power allocation
Wiretap channels, imperfect SIC among the subcarriers
T.-X. Zheng et al. [96]
SISOME wireless ad hoc network
Global perfect CSI
Optimize full duplex
Imperfect SIC receivers deployment
T.-X. Zheng et al. [97]
Two-tie heterogeneous network Perfect CSI of the desired users Analyze secrecy
Imperfect SIC Statistical CSI of the eavesdroppers outage probability
T. Zhang et al. [98]
A cognitive wiretap channel with a multiple antenna Perfect CSI of the desired users Analyze secrecy
full duplex secondary receiver, perfect SIC No CSI of the eavesdroppers outage probability
wide secrecy throughput maximization. T. Zhang et al. design the secrecy communication schemes for a cognitive
wiretap channel with a multiple antenna full duplex secondary receiver [98]. A brief summary of above work is
given in Table IX.
B. Full Duplex Transmitter and Receiver
O. Cepheli et al. investigate the bidirectional secure communication where two multiple-antenna full duplex
nodes communicate with each other in presence of a multiple antenna eavesdropper [99]. The global perfect CSI
and imperfect SIC assumptions are adopted. The beamforming vectors are designed to minimize the total transmit
power subject to the secrecy and the QoS constraints. Assuming the global perfect CSI and perfect SIC, Y. Wan
et al. maximize the secrecy sum rate of bidirectional full duplex communication systems in presence of a single-
antenna eavesdropper under the sum transmit power constraint [100]. A null space based suboptimal design is also
proposed to reduce the computational complexity. Q. Li et al. extend this design to the imperfect SIC and the
imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper case [101]. A brief summary of above work is given in Table X.
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TABLE X: Bidirectional Secure Communications with Full Duplex Transmitters and Receivers
Paper System Model CSI Objective
O. Cepheli et al. [99]
Multiple-antenna nodes
Global perfect CSI
Minimize the total transmit power
Transmit and receive beamforming, imperfect SIC under rate constraints
Y. Wan et al. [100]
Multiple-antenna transmitter and receiver
Global perfect CSI
Maximize the secrecy sum rate
Single-antenna eavesdropper, perfect SIC under the transmit power constraints
Q. Li et al. [101]
Multiple-antenna transmitter and receiver Perfect CSI of the eavesdropper Maximize the secrecy sum rate
Single-antenna eavesdropper, imperfect SIC Imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper under the transmit power constraints
TABLE XI: Secure Communications with Full Duplex Base Station
Paper System Model CSI Objective
F. Zhu et al. [102]
A single-antenna transmitter, a single-antenna receiver
Global perfect CSI
Maximize the secrecy transmit rate under
A single-antenna eavesdropper, perfect SIC the secrecy receive rate constraint
F. Zhu et al. [103]
A single-antenna transmitter, a single-antenna receiver
Global perfect CSI
Minimize the power at base station
Multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers, imperfect SIC under different SINR constraints
Y. Sun et al. [104]
Multiple single-antenna transmitters and receivers Perfect CSI of the legitimate links Minimize the total power
Multiple multiple-antenna eavesdroppers, imperfect SIC Imperfect CSI of eavesdroppers under secrecy rate constraints
Y. Wang et al. [105]
A single-antenna transmitter, a single-antenna receiver
Global perfect CSI
Maximize the secrecy rate under
a single-antenna eavesdropper, imperfect SIC power and harvested energy constraints
C. Full Duplex Base Station
Considering a multiple-antenna full duplex base station which communicates with a single-antenna transmitter
and a single-antenna receiver simultaneously with single-antenna eavesdropper, F. Zhu et al. investigate the joint
precoding and AN generation design at the base station with global perfect CSI and perfect SIC to guarantee
both the uplink and downlink transmission security [102]. This work is further extended to the imperfect SIC
case [103]. Y. Sun et al. study a more general system where a multiple-antenna full duplex base station receives
information from multiple single-antenna uplink users and transmit information to multiple single-antenna downlink
users simultaneously in the presence of multiple potential eavesdroppers [104], as shown in Fig. 7. It is assumed
that only imperfect CSIs of eavesdroppers are available at the base station. A robust resource allocation scheme is
designed to minimize a total of uplink and downlink transmit power subject to the uplink and the downlink rate and
security rate constraints. As illustrated in Fig. 8, the proposed design achieves significantly higher power efficiency
comparing to the baseline ZFBF scheme. Y. Wang et al. investigate the secure transmission for simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer full duplex base station systems [105]. A brief summary of above work is given in
Table XI.
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Fig. 8: Average trade off between the downlink and uplink total transmit powers. Experimental results extracted
from [104].
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TABLE XII: Secure Communications with Full Duplex Active Eavesdropper
Paper System Model CSI Objective
A. Mukherjee et al. [106]
Multiple-antenna nodes
Global perfect CSI
Minimize the secrecy rate
Imperfect SIC under a maximum power constraint
X. Tang et al. [107]
Single-antenna nodes Perfect CSI of the eavesdropper Design optimal strategies within
Imperfect SIC Statistical CSI of the eavesdropper a hierarchical game theory framework
M. R. Adedi et al. [108]
Multiple-antenna nodes Imperfect CSI between the Maximize the secrecy rate
Imperfect SIC eavesdropper and other nodes under the transmit power constraint
D. Full Duplex Eavesdropper
Standing at the point of the eavesdropper, A. Mukherjee et al. consider a multiple antenna full duplex active
eavesdropper which simultaneously eavesdrops and attacks the legitimate MIMO communication link [106]. It
is assumed that the eavesdropper has the perfect knowledge of the channels among all nodes and the imperfect
estimation of the self interference channel. Then, the jamming signals which minimize the secrecy rate are designed
based on the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) analysis. X. Tang et al. formulate the active eavesdropper problem into a
hierarchical game theory problem where the eavesdropper and the legitimate user behave as a leader and a follower
[107]. Then, the optimal transmission strategies at both the eavesdropper and the legitimate user’s side are designed.
Under the CSI uncertainty condition, M. R. Adedi et al. design robust transmission schemes to maximize the secrecy
rate with the multiple antenna full duplex active eavesdropper and the multiple antenna full duplex receiver [108].
A brief summary of above work is given in Table XII.
There are some other works investigating full-duplex relay secure communications [109]–[112].
VIII. OTHER IMPORTANT RESEARCH WORK
Layered approaches have been traditionally applied for wireless cooperative networks, where each layer in the
protocol stack is designed and operated independently. The motivation for such layered approaches is to exploit
the advantage of the modularity in system design since the system dynamics caused by the interactions among the
protocols at the different layers could be fairly complex. However, careful exploitation of some cross-layer protocol
interactions can lead to a more efficient performance of the transmission protocol stack and hence better application
level protocol performance in various wireless networking scenarios. This is particularly true for realizing network
security since by exploiting the security capacity and signal processing technologies at the physical layer and the
authentication and watermarking strategies at the application layer, the available network resources can be utilized
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more efficiently. A joint physical-application layer secure transmission scheme which includes physical layer channel
coding and application layer authentication and watermarking is proposed for multimedia communication systems
[113]. Simulations show that the joint scheme improves the verification probability for both static and dynamic
networks. On the other hand, to limit the information leakage at bit-level, the physical layer security technique
is exploited to guarantee the secure video transmission [114]. Moreover, physical layer security aware routing for
multi-hop ad hoc networks are investigated [115]–[117]. Other researchers study the physical layer authentication
[118], [119].
In addition to theoretical studies, it is also necessary to investigate the practical test bed design for physical layer
security. This is important to evaluate the usefulness of the physical layer based security schemes and evaluate their
performance in a practical transmission environment. Both WiFi and LTE test beds are built to examine the secrecy
schemes including secrecy coding, secret key generation, and artificial noise and beamforming [120], [121]. It is
revealed that in practical transmission environment, AN is still an effective approach to degrade the performance of
the eavesdropper even when the desired user and the eavesdropper are very close to each other. Also, it is shown
that the channel realizations have a significant impact on the secrecy coding performance. Other practical prototypes
involve more on secrecy key generation, including in ultra wideband systems [122], IEEE 802.11 systems [123],
[124], FM/TV systems [125], etc.
IX. FUTURE TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
In this section, a number of technical challenges for physical layer security in 5G and beyond are discussed.
A. Physical Layer Security Coding
As indicated in Table I, in terms of mutual information criterion, current LDPC code designs can only achieve
the weak secrecy for the special BEC model. For strong secrecy, it further requires the main channel to be noiseless.
How to design LDPC codes which can achieve the weak/stong secrecy for a more general channel such as the
Gaussian wiretap channel is still a challenge problem. In terms of BER criterion, the LDPC codes for MIMO and
massive MIMO systems can be investigated.
As indicated in Table II, most of current polar code designs require the perfect channel knowledge of the
eavesdropper at the transmitter to achieve the weak/strong secrecy. How to extend the polar code designs to a more
reasonable case where only channel distribution knowledge of the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter is an
important research issue. This point also applies for lattice code designs.
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B. Physical Layer Security in Massive MIMO Systems
The transmission designs in [60] are more effective to combat the pilot contamination attack for strong correlation
channels. The defense strategy for i.i.d. fading channels in [61] requires the length of the pilot signal scales with
the number of transmit antennas, which will significantly reduce the transmission efficiency for massive MIMO
systems. The defense strategy in [62] is used for secret key agreement. Therefore, for massive MIMO transmission
with active eavesdropper, the existing approaches are preliminary and far-from realizing secure communications
theoretically and practically for massive MIMO systems. Several important issues need to be clarified for massive
MIMO systems under pilot contamination attack: 1) What is the fundamental limit of secure communication? 2)
Are there any unified transmission schemes which are effective for general massive MIMO channels? 3) How to
design the secure transmission schemes in practical communication systems?
Since massive MIMO is the key technology for 5G wireless networks, another important research point for physi-
cal layer security in massive MIMO systems is the secure transmission scheme designs for the joint implementation
of massive MIMO and other important 5G technologies, e.g., the secure mmWave massive MIMO communications
and the secure massive communications in heterogeneous networks, etc.
C. Physical Layer Security for mmWave Communications
Normally, highly directional beamforming is used in mmWave communications to combat the path loss. This
directional beamforming significantly depends on the accuracy of the CSI of the desired users. Similar as the massive
MIMO case, for TDD communication systems, if an active eavesdropper jeopardizes the channel estimation phase
for the desired user, this may result in a significant secure threat. However, little research has been available on
how to defend the active eavesdropper in mmWave communications.
For a lower implementation cost, hybrid digital and analog precoding is often used for mmWave communications
to reduce the number of RF chains. How to design secure transmission schemes based on this hybrid structure for
both point-to-point and network mmWave MIMO communication systems can be studied. Secure mmWave vehicle
to vehicle communications is another important research point.
D. Physical Layer Security in Heterogeneous Networks
Currently, most works for physical layer security in heterogeneous networks [77]–[82] focus on analyzing the
secrecy performance of the networks. Since multiple tiers are available to multiple users, another possible research
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strategy is to investigate how to properly schedule these users access to different network ties in order to better
safeguard the multi-tier communications. Based on this, precoder designs can be studied to further improve the
secrecy spectrum efficiency. Moreover, the interference generated by multiple tiers may be properly exploited to
degrade the performance of the eavesdropper.
E. Physical Layer Security of NOMA
The security risk is a particular concern for the multiple access techniques such as NOMA since the user is allowed
to decode the transmit information for other users. As a complement of current encryption techniques, physical
layer security technology is a good candidate for improving the communication security for NOMA systems.
Currently, there are only some very initial research results for physical layer security of NOMA [85]–[87], primary
focusing on analyzing the secrecy performance of NOMA systems or providing the power allocation policy for an
ideal simple NOMA model. More research work are required to design effective and efficient secure communication
schemes for practical NOMA systems.
F. Physical Layer Security for Full Duplex Technology
If all the nodes in the systems are capable of full duplex communication ability, how to design the effective secure
communication scheme remains unknown. In particular, the full duplex transmitter and receiver can generate AN
to degrade the eavesdropper, while the full duplex eavesdropper can also generate AN to interfere the transmitter
and the receiver. This may be formulated into a hierarchical game framework where some game theory methods
can be exploited to solve the problem.
Another point is that for full duplex base station scenarios, current research assume both transmitter and receiver
are equipped with single-antenna. The extension to multiple-antenna case can be investigated.
G. Physical Layer Security for Other 5G Scenarios and Beyond
Physical layer security technique have many other applications in 5G communications and beyond. For example,
traditional security key mechanisms are mainly based on the distribution of shared keys. Due to the mobility and
scalability of 5G wireless networks [1], this task is nontrivial. The physical layer secret-key generation was first
investigated in [126], [127], where correlated observations of noisy phenomena can be exploited to generate secret
keys by exchanging information over a public channel. As one of the few implementable physical layer security
techniques, key generation can be constructed in current wireless devices. Many prototypes have been reported
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involving physical layer secret-key generation [122], [128]–[130]. However, thorough study examining the effects
of environment conditions and channel parameters on the physical layer secret-key generation is still missing. In
addition, in the case of key agreement, most studies consider key generation schemes with passive eavesdroppers,
where the active attacks have been less studied.
The internet of thing (IoT) is the network of physical objects embedded with actuators, radio-frequency iden-
tifications, sensors, software, and connectivity to enable it to interact with manufacturers, operators, and/or other
connected devices to reach common goals. 5G will be a key enabler for the IoT by providing the planform to connect
a massive number of machine-type communication (MTC) devices to internet. MTC devices are usually low data
rate requirements, periodic data traffic arrivals, limited hardware and signal processing complexity, limited storage
memory, compact form factors, and significant energy constraints [131]. These aspects have received relatively
limited attention on physical layer security in the literature. For example, a theoretically well-founded and holistic
approach to precisely characterize complexity and energy constraints in physical layer security designs is still
missing. Moreover, a network of massive MTC devices in IoT requires novel fundamental definitions of secrecy
metrics for point-to-multipoint systems and multipoint-to-point systems with a very large number of downlink
receivers and uplink transmitters, respectively. In addition, the communication channels of MTC devices may have
very different propagation characteristics as opposed to the conventional Rayleigh and Rician multipath channel
models for broadband microwave systems [132]. How to securely transmit data over these channels remains largely
open.
Other interesting work includes the interplay between wireless power transfer and physical layer security [133],
[134]. In particular, it is shown in [133], [134] that the jamming noise which can be used to provide security may
not always be harmful and can be an energy beam as well. Therefore, it may be a good integration between wireless
power transfer and physical layer security design.
X. CONCLUSION
The emerging and development of future wireless technologies such as massive MIMO technology, millimeter
wave communications, machine type communication and Internet of Thing, etc have brought out new security
challenges for 5G networks. To design efficient secure transmission schemes for 5G wireless communications that
exploit propagation properties of radio channels in physical layer has attracted wide research interests recently.
This approach is referred as physical layer security for 5G technologies. The physical layer security approaches are
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robust to more and more advanced passive and active eavesdroppers and are flexible for secret key generation in
5G networks. With careful management and implementation, physical layer security and conventional encryption
techniques can formulate a well-integrated security solution together that efficiently safeguards the confidential and
privacy communication data in 5G networks. We wish that the research results in this special issue and our survey
paper will be helpful to the readers to have a better understanding of the benefits and opportunities that physical
layer security techniques provide for 5G and future wireless networks.
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